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 In this paper, we propose that the ownership structure in the cooperative
form acts as an environmental buffer. It is a mechanism to obtain stronger linkages
with suppliers by internalizing them, and in this way, obtaining fundamental
resources. Using this strategy, the cooperative form can isolate itself from adverse
environments and from competition from other organizational forms. Although
cooperatives have higher survival probability in any economic context, in rival
ideological environments they have less support than other organizational forms. To
test these ideas, we have chosen data from the Spanish olive oil milling industry for
1944–98. During this period, Spain changed from a dictatorial to a democratic
regime and from a self-subsistence economy in the post civil-war period to a broad
liberal international economy. The results show that, whereas other organizational
forms are affected by economic and ideological influences, the cooperative form
isolates itself by changing the competition level.
INTRODUCTION
Within the research on the cooperative form, there remains a question the answer
to which is not resolved: Does a cooperative’s unusual ownership and governance
structure give it any advantage over its commercial rivals? To respond to this ques-
tion is difficult because organizational forms pursue different targets (Pencavel,
2002). Consequently, their performance criteria for measuring success are also dif-
ferent (Rothschild and Whitt, 1989, pp. 160–1). Depending on the characteristics
studied, authors reach completely opposed conclusions. There exist situations
where the cooperative form could be dominated by the capitalist form (Ben-ner
and Jones, 1995; Putterman, 1982), or where the cooperative form is as sturdy as
the capitalist form (Ben-ner, 1988). However, there also exist factors that could
favour the cooperative form (Bonin et al., 1993; Russell, 1985).
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These factors include its fundamental characteristic, organizational democracy,
which generates incentives and motivation among workers inside the organization
(Simons and Ingram, 2000). However, democracy could be harmful when the 
ideology of the environment is opposed to it (Simons and Ingram, 1997). More-
over, democracy is the opposite of a hierarchy or strategic leadership in which the
fundamental organizational characteristic is the drive to obtain efficiency
(Williamson, 1987). In the empirical arena, results are not conclusive when coop-
erative productivity is compared with ordinary capitalist firms (Bonin et al., 1993).
In summary, a systematic study that controls for firm size, industry, and inter-
nal structure is fundamental before we can specify which organizational type is
preferable in relation to its performance: the cooperative form or other capitalist
forms (Rothschild and Whitt, 1989, p. 167).
To our knowledge, there are only three systematic studies that compare co-
operatives with other organizational forms in relation to their organizational per-
formance, controlling by internal structure, industry and environment: Barnett and
Carroll (1987), Rao and Neilsen (1992), and Barron et al. (1998). Rao and Neilsen’s
paper (1992) is the only work that specifies an internal characteristic as the reason
why stock companies are less vulnerable: agency costs. The other two studies
describe the interrelationships between both populations but through influences
external to the organization.
In this paper, we follow the same tradition as these three papers, and try to
respond to the question proposed by Barron et al. (1998, p. 28): ‘Does the co-
operatives’ [credit unions] unusual ownership and governance structure give them
any advantages over their commercial rivals?’. To respond to this question, we
examine whether different ownership structures (cooperative versus other organi-
zational forms) could translate into advantages or disadvantages for survival when
they compete with each other and face different economic or ideological environ-
ments. We propose a different explanation that leads to results opposed to those
in Rao and Neilsen’s paper (1992) but fully ratifies the finding reached in Barron
et al.’s paper (1998), namely, that cooperatives are advantageous because they use
the ownership structure as a mechanism to obtain fundamental resources from the
environment. This crucial advantage allows them to isolate themselves from the
environment and act as predators in the face of competition from other organi-
zational forms.
This finding is supported by results obtained from the population of Spanish
olive oil mills (‘almazaras’ in Spanish) for 1944–98. During this period, Spain suf-
fered radical economic and political changes that provide environmental variabil-
ity in which to test the robustness of the interrelations between the cooperative
form and other ordinary capitalist forms.
The structure of the paper is as follows: firstly, we present the description of the
olive oil milling industry and the political and economic conditions pertaining
during this historical period in Spain; secondly, we develop the theoretical back-
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ground; thirdly, we describe the research design, and show the results; and finally,
we conclude with our thoughts with respect to the findings.
OLIVE OIL MILLING INDUSTRY AND SPANISH POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Industry Structure
The activity of oil mills (‘almazaras’ in Spanish) is centred on extraction, market-
ing and storage of virgin olive oil. During the study period, marketing was under-
taken through middlemen, and was given little importance as an internal
organizational activity. Only now, these organizations are becoming aware of the
advantages to be gained by making this an internal activity (Ernst & Young Asses-
sors, 1992, p. 175). Storage is a necessary activity, but does not entail a great con-
sumption of either human or material resources, and can be considered an
irrelevant activity. Therefore, the extraction stage is the fundamental activity of an
oil mill, and the differences between the mills are determined by their internal
characteristics (such as extraction technology, power installed, number of employ-
ees, or milling capacity).
The significance of the extraction stage implies that the olive (the sole raw mate-
rial) is the critical resource, or the niche in which the oil mills operate. No other
relevant resource can be found. A specialized work force is not required. Customers
act in a monopoly regimen and release the olive oil onto the final market. However,
we might assume that the production level is independent of customer demand
because of the intervention of the Spanish State. The oil mills have a guarantee
to sell all their production at a minimum price (paid by the State). This has con-
tributed to a lack of orientation to the market in these firms (Torres, 1998).
Cooperatives Versus Other Organizational Forms
As in other industry sectors, the ownership and governance structure might be
chosen to distinguish two organizational forms, the cooperative form and other
capitalist forms (Barnett and Carroll, 1987; Barron et al., 1998; Ranger-Moore et
al., 1991; Rao and Neilsen, 1992). The former is constituted as a democratic orga-
nization, and its management is based on the principle of one member, one vote.
The other organizational forms (capitalist forms) have the characteristic that the
number of votes is directly linked to the size of shareholding (Barron, 1995,
p. 138).
Cooperatives in this industry are typical of agricultural cooperatives (Hans-
mann, 2000, pp. 120–45). Similar to cheese, canning, or fruit-juice factories, they
not only take possession of their members’ commodities (olives) but also process
them into finished product (olive oil). Their members are private small olive
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farmers who contribute with their own crops. In this way, they are closer to Israeli
moshavim than to kibbutzim (Simons and Ingram, 2000, p. 62) or to Hungarian agri-
cultural cooperatives (Carroll et al., 1988).
Environmental Variability in Spain
The biological nature of olives as a resource means large year-to-year fluctuations
(Figure 1) and its transformation process depends on a biological system involving
many factors that are difficult to predict and control, such as climate and diseases.
Moreover, olive trees are a long-time investment because they take many years to
grow before they become productive. These aspects, together with the rapid dete-
rioration of olives from the moment they are harvested, create uncertainty in this
sector. However, farmers in Spain cannot eliminate it because of the lack of a
futures market and the strategic disadvantage of forward contracts because of the
monopsony situation.
The environment in Spain has undergone several stages, both political and eco-
nomical, that run from an absolute precariousness to a relatively stable and
advanced situation.
General Franco, after a military coup and subsequent civil war, overthrew the
constitutional government in 1939. The consequence was a military dictatorship,
which stood until 1975. During this period, two clear economic stages may be
identified: (1) a self-subsistence economy distinguished by a post-war economic
depression and the international isolation of fascist regimes by western demo-
cracies when they won the Second World War; and (2) incipient economic devel-
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Figure 1. Evolution of the annual olive harvests 1944–1998
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opment after the USA recognized the Franco regime in 1960, leading to western
democracies removing economic isolation (Tortella, 1994, p. 204).
In relation to cooperatives, Spain has other paradoxes, such as the network of
the workers’ cooperatives of Mondragon (Gutierrez-Johnson and Whyte, 1977).
However, the relationship of Franco and the cooperatives was always hard 
(Rothschild and Whitt, 1989, p. 170). Franco was worried more about ideological
deviation than economic solutions (Marí-Vidal and Juliá-Igual, 2001, p. 67). He
promulgated a new law on cooperatives in 1942: the Law of Cooperatives of the
New State (‘Ley de Cooperativas del Nuevo Estado’). The aim of this law was to keep
ideological ‘purity’ through strict control. For instance, the Spanish State had the
right to veto democratic decisions of the cooperative at any time (Marí-Vidal and
Juliá-Igual, 2001, p. 66). When the dictator passed away in 1975, a representative
democracy was restored with full political rights. New rules were promulgated in
1978 for cooperatives: Cooperative Firms Regulations (‘Reglamento sobre Sociedades
Cooperativas’). With the new rules, cooperative members recovered some rights: self-
determination and the right to be informed (Marí-Vidal and Juliá-Igual, 2001,
p. 68).
Two clear economic periods may also be identified: (1) economic liberalism as
a consequence of the demand to belong to the European Union (EU); and (2) the
European Union period from 1986, when Spain was integrated into the EU with
complete economic rights.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Environmental Variability
Inter-organizational linkages are one important means for protecting an organi-
zation from environmental variability (Aldrich, 1979; Dickson and Weaver, 1997;
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). One of the main aims of inter-organizational link-
ages is to ensure the stable flow of critical resources (Pennings, 1981; Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978). An organization may form alliances with other organizations that
can supply fundamental resources (Wright and Lockett, 2003). If insulation from
the environment means protection from organizational failure, then organizations
with inter-organizational linkages should have a lower mortality rate (Baum and
Oliver, 1991; Ingram and Baum, 1997; Miner et al., 1990; Oliver, 1991; Stearns
et al., 1987).
In this sense, the cooperative’s suppliers form the ownership structure. That is
to say, cooperative owners have a double role as member and supplier. This implies
that the cooperative, through its ownership structure, has internalized the linkages
with the suppliers that provide it with most of the critical resources to survive: the
olive. Members participate in the organization as suppliers and, consequently, have
greater identity with and commitment towards it (Bonin et al., 1993; Locke and
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Schweiger, 1979). The cooperative philosophy is based on mutual aid and co-
operation to enhance business viability (Staber, 1992, p. 1192). This implies that
members have a vested interest in the success of their organization (Simons and
Ingram, 2000). Moreover, it would be necessary that cooperative principles reaf-
firm this level of commitment by obliging members to participate in the coopera-
tive’s production process (International Cooperative Alliance, 1995). That is, the
member has an exclusive and strong linkage with its cooperative, preventing 
any other outside activity. This implies that any cooperative, merely by its 
ownership structure, would have guaranteed the supply of resources by all of its 
supplier-members.
The ownership structure of other organizational forms is different and does not
guarantee the same flow of resources in this natural way. Therefore, they need to
obtain the same resources through greater effort. By combining these theoretical
explanations, we formulate Hypothesis 1 as:
Hypothesis 1: Cooperatives are less likely to fail than firms integrated in other
organizational forms.
Hypothesis 1 generally could be considered as a rule in the face of ordinary envi-
ronmental fluctuations. However, the environment could also suffer shock periods
where there is high scarcity of resources. In these situations, linkages would be
buffers to organizations since they continue supplying resources, while organiza-
tions without linkages will have more problems in acquiring them (Miner et al.,
1990, pp. 691–2). Consequently, the cooperative form would suffer less from envi-
ronmental shocks than other organizational forms because the contribution from
its supplier-members is guaranteed. Other organizational forms will need to obtain
resources through stronger competition.
The Spanish case is not an exception, and, as noted above, there were two shock
periods where the environment was more aggressive. Firstly, during the post civil-
war period as a consequence of the deep economic depression, and secondly,
during the European Union period because elimination of tariff protection
imposed stronger competition with firms in the rest of Europe.
If competition is directly and positively related to the probability of failure
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1989), then it is possible to foresee a link 
between shock periods and the probability of organizational death, as stated in
Hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2: Cooperatives are less likely to fail in the presence of shock periods
than are firms integrated in other organizational forms.
The ownership structure of the cooperative has another fundamental character-
istic that affects another kind of linkage: it builds a direct participatory democracy
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in its government structure (Rothschild and Whitt, 1989). This attribute by itself
could generate several problems: (1) it hinders internal hierarchy or strategic lead-
ership, which is a fundamental organizational characteristic for obtaining effi-
ciency (Williamson, 1987); (2) it creates agency costs (Rao and Neilsen, 1992); and
(3) it represents a rival ideology to some regimes (Ingram and Simons, 2000), espe-
cially dictatorships (Rothschild and Whitt, 1989, p. 168).
A fascist regime has multiple characteristics, but the important ones in this
context are its rigid hierarchical government structure, similar to an ordinary 
corporation in a capitalist economy, and its ideology. On the other hand, the 
structure and the intellectual background of any cooperative are democratic
(Rothschild and Whitt, 1989, p. 13).
As a general rule, organizations adopt institutionally prescribed characteristics.
Moreover, institutional pressures oblige structural similarities or isomorphism
across organizations during a period of nationalism (Dacin, 1997, p. 72). This iso-
morphic pressure can be particularly severe when an organization’s ideology is
opposed to the environment, since the incentives will favour organizational prac-
tices that are consistent with the environmental ideology (Dobrev, 2001; Simons
and Ingram, 1997). The State struggles to use its coercive capacity for its own 
ideological purposes (Wade et al., 1998). Therefore, the State could penalize orga-
nizations with different ideologies in several dimensions (Ingram and Simons,
2000). In this sense, it seems logical to think that a fascist regime, which has vio-
lently overthrown a government because of all the ‘problems’ arising from its
democratic condition, will also try to remove organizations representative of the
democracy. Therefore, we formulate Hypothesis 3 as:
Hypothesis 3: Cooperatives are more likely to fail in the presence of a fascist
regime than are firms integrated in other organizational forms.
Competition Among Organizational Forms
By using Hutchinson’s terminology (1957), the fundamental niche of an organi-
zational form is the n-dimensional resource space that can sustain the functioning
of organizations that embody the form. When the fundamental niches of two
organizational forms coincide, then it is necessary to bear in mind the realized
niche of each organizational form. That is to say, the realized niche is the avail-
able n-dimensional resource space of an organizational form when competitors
are present (Hannan and Freeman, 1989).
As mentioned above, it is implied that the ownership structure either has or does
not have linkages and, therefore, has or does not have access to fundamental
resources. The cooperative form can exclude other forms from its fundamental
niche because its members only facilitate their resources to itself. That is to say, it
can isolate itself from other competitor forms and reduce them to their realized
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niche. However, other organizational forms cannot do the same in relation to the
cooperative. In this way, an organizational form (the cooperative, in our case) that
can reduce the realized niche of other organizational forms is a stronger com-
petitor (Hannan and Carroll, 1992, pp. 28–9). If we understand organizational
strength as the competitive effect on the survival rate (Barnett, 1997), then we can
enunciate Hypothesis 4 as:
Hypothesis 4: The larger realized niche of the cooperative form implies that firms
integrated in other organizational forms are more likely to fail.
Since other organizational forms do not have ability to reduce the realized niche
of the cooperative form because these have guaranteed their supply of resources,
they will be weak competitors in reference to the cooperative form. Therefore,
Hypothesis 5 would be:
Hypothesis 5: A larger realized niche of other organizational forms does not
imply that firms integrated in the cooperative form are more likely to fail.
Lastly, the aim of cooperatives is to obtain resources, but their strategic advantage
is to get them through their members. In this way, one could imagine that the real
unit by which the cooperatives compete is the member, not the resources. In this
sense, the only real competitors for cooperatives are themselves.
Hypothesis 6: The larger realized niche of the cooperative form implies greater
likelihood of failure for cooperatives.
METHOD
Data
To test these hypotheses, a database was built containing information on 1298 oil
mills. These were all the oil mills that have operated in the province of Jaén (Spain)
at some time during the period 1944–98. The database has been built from the
following sources:
• Register of agricultural firms held at the provincial office in Jaén of the Agricultural and
Fisheries Department (a department of the Andalusian Regional Government). This reg-
ister is the main information source for the database since it allowed the infor-
mation to be obtained by each ‘almazara’ through the temporal horizon of this
work. The inscription in this register is fundamental because an olive mill
cannot start its activity or modify the existing one without this legal require-
ment. From 1944 to date, the staff from this Register have been checking the
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observed data for each olive mill annually ‘in situ’. If data were contradictory,
then the continuing activity of the oil mill could be refused. From this regis-
ter, we have taken the following information for each variable: date of birth,
date of disbandment (if applicable), milling capacity installed, organizational
form, number of employees, type of production ownership, and level of tech-
nological development.
• Register of cooperatives held at the provincial office in Jaén of the Trade and Industry
Department (a department of the Andalusian Regional Government). The special char-
acteristics and the different nature of cooperatives have caused strict control
from the dictatorial government to the present time. A consequence of this
control was the Register of Cooperatives. In this register, information that is more
exhaustive may be found: managers’ names, members’ names, internal deci-
sions concerning change of activity, etc. Since this register only facilitates
information about cooperatives, its only utility in this paper is to test the reli-
ability of the information in the Register of Agricultural Firms.
• Agricultural Statistics Yearbooks. These yearbooks contain the official statistical
information published by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
(Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación). From these yearbooks, we have
taken the annual oil harvests in the province of Jaén.
• Ministerial Orders and Royal Decrees (Legislative Decrees in Franco’s era). The Min-
istry of Industry and Energy publishes these legal instructions in the Official
Gazette. They set the price of electricity by year in Spain during the com-
plete period of analysis.
Variables
The dependent variable is:
• Firm failure. This is the dependent variable for the entire statistical test. The
failure of an oil mill was considered to have occurred when it stopped oper-
ating, that is, when the oil mill failed as a collective actor, but not when its
ownership or trade name changed. In these cases, there were no justifiable
reasons to conclude that the whole organization was transformed. In fact, it
could continue to use the same procedures and routines (Baum and Mezias,
1992; Ingram and Inman, 1996). There are 11 mergers that have been taken
as disappearances in the years in which they occurred because they might be
considered as the loss of an independent collective actor (an oil mill). Although
the mergers could be a symptom of success, we have considered them by using
the criterion of other similar papers (Boone et al., 2000; Hannan and Carroll,
1992; Hannan and Freeman, 1989). In any case, the effect on the results would
be insignificant because of the low proportion of failures from mergers
(Agarwal et al., 2002, p. 981).
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Independent variables are:
• Cooperative form/other organizational forms. We have analysed this effect through
two mechanisms: (1) by introducing a dummy variable which has a value of
1 when the oil mill was integrated in the cooperative form and a value of 0
otherwise (Barron et al., 1998; Rao and Neilsen, 1992); and (2) by using two
different models for each organizational form. To get this information we sep-
arated the database into two groups.
• Cooperative realized niche. We have used as a proxy of the cooperative realized
niche the milling capacities installed for all the cooperative oil mills (in million
kilos). This is the subset of resources that the cooperative form might obtain
in the presence of the other competitive forms. In this way, the cooperative
realized niche would be the sum of individual sizes of all cooperatives of this
population.
• Capitalist realized niche. This is approximated by the mass of other organiza-
tional forms. The temporal evolution of these two variables in our data in
particular may be seen in Figure 2.
• Dictatorship/democracy. We have analysed the influence of ideological periods
(Miner et al., 1990) through two mechanisms: (1) by introducing a dummy
variable which takes the value of 1 for the period 1939–75, and the value of
0 for the democratic period; and (2) by using two different models for each
ideological period.
1140 M. Núñez-Nickel and J. Moyano-Fuentes
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Years
M
ill
in
g 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 (i
n T
m.
/8 
h.)
Cooperative realized niche
Capitalist realized niche
Figure 2. Cooperative realized niche and capitalist realized niche, 1944–1998
This is the pre-peer-reviewed version of the following article:  
Journal of Management Studies, vol.41, n.7, p.1131-1152,  
which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2004.00469.x
• The effect of the economic shocks has been included through two dummy
variables: postwar and European Union periods. Both variables respectively take
the value 1 between 1944 to 1959, and 1986 to the present time, and the
value 0 otherwise (Dacin, 1997; Staber, 1992).
Control variables are:
• Organizational age. This variable was defined as the number of years since the
date of an oil mill’s founding and its disbanding, or the end of the study period
(1998). It is necessary as a control variable to overcome the left truncated data
in studies of organizational mortality (Carroll and Hannan, 2000). To control
for age dependence in mortality we used eight age-defined period dummy
variables.
• Fundamental niche. Annual olive harvests (in million kilos) have been included
to measure the fundamental niche since the olive might be considered the
main resource in this industry.
• Type of production ownership. Boone et al. (2000) discovered that whether pro-
duction ownership fell on one or various owners affects the probability of
organizational failure. For this reason, a dummy variable was created that tells
us if the oil mill is operated by the owner (value 1) or if it is operated under
lease (value 0).
• Organizational size. We have identified the number of workers as the variable
representing the size of each oil mill (Boone et al., 2000; Wholey and 
Brittain, 1989).
• Technological development. It has been demonstrated that technological develop-
ment influences the probability of survival (Barnett, 1997; Baum et al., 1995).
We have approximated this effect by the installed power in the motor set of
each organization divided by its worker number.
• Electric energy cost. Electric energy is the power source that supplies the pro-
duction system of an oil mill. This variable takes into account the cost of this
supply in Pesetas per kWh and expresses the variable unit cost derived from
the consumption of electric power. Moreover, apart from the raw material
(olives), we could say that it is the main cost in an ‘almazara’. This variable has
been introduced following the approach in other papers of estimating vital
rates to monitor the incidence of the main organization costs (Barnett and
Carroll, 1987; Mascarenhas, 1996). Another possible cost could be labour
costs. However, as noted above, a specialized work force is not required and,
consequently, its cost is irrelevant in relation to energy cost. Nevertheless, tech-
nological development could be considered a proxy of this relationship.
• Population density. This variable allows controlling of one source of intra-
population competition. In the density dependence model (Hannan, 1989),
the intensity of competition varies according to the number of organizations
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in a population. Population density was measured as the total number of oil
mills existing at the start of each year. The density evolution against year for
our population may be seen in Figure 3.
• Concentration. Since trends in density often roughly coincide with those of
concentration (Hannan and Carroll, 1992, p. 48), we have also decided to
include this variable (Figure 4). We assess the degree of concentration by the
Herfindahl index (Barnett and Carroll, 1987; Wholey et al., 1992).
Analysis
To carry out the necessary tests, we have used the piecewise-exponential model
with the following hazard rate:
where b is the associated vector of coefficients and x the matrix of exogenous and
control variables. The values of the different variables were introduced in one-
year increments. As noted above, this model allows a solution of the left-truncated
data problem by including organizational age as a control variable (eight segments
in our case), and using a calendar time as the dependent variable, which allows
the instantaneous probability of failure, r(t), to be estimated. These data have 114
as left-censored data and 487 as right-censored data. To overcome this data char-
acteristic, maximum partial likelihood estimation was necessary (Cox and Oakes,
r t e x t( ) = ( )b
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1984; Lawless, 1982). Following this methodology, we used the statistical package
Stata 6.0 (Stata Corporation, 1999) to estimate the b parameters. If b has a posi-
tive sign, the organization’s failure probability will increase. Alternatively, if the
sign is negative this probability will be reduced.
RESULTS
Table I shows basic statistics and correlations between the independent variables
and the control variables.
Table II shows the models built to test the influence of the independent vari-
ables on the probability of organizational failure. The first model is made using
the total population database. The sample has been divided into two periods (dic-
tatorship and democracy) to make the second and third models. We have also
divided the total database in two: cooperative form, and other capitalist forms
(Models 4 and 5). Lastly, we have built four more models: one for each period and
for each organizational form. In this way, we might analyse influences through
independent variables, and in an individual form for each period and organiza-
tional form.
Model 1 shows that the organizations making up the cooperative form benefit
from more guarantees of survival. The coefficient of cooperative form has a nega-
tive and significant sign (p < 0.0001). This circumstance is independently main-
tained in spite of the ideological movement in society (Models 2 and 3), and
suggests that Hypothesis 1 can be accepted. The fact that owner and supplier coin-
cide in the same person in the cooperative, together with the exclusive and strong
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Figure 4. Concentration levels in Jaen’s oil milling industry, 1944–1998
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Table I. Basic statistics and correlations
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. Organizational 37.26 23.92
age
2. Cooperative 0.309 0.462 0.036
form
3. Postwar period 0.371 0.483 -0.240 -0.366
4. European 0.140 0.347 0.203 0.266 -0.311
Union period
5. Dictatorship/ 0.727 0.445 -0.249 -0.377 0.470 -0.661
democracy
6. Fundamental 659.73 404.85 0.197 0.280 -0.379 0.632 -0.623
niche
7. Cooperative 0.460 0.422 0.291 0.418 -0.691 0.801 -0.816 0.719
realized niche
8. Capitalist 0.568 0.139 -0.104 -0.188 0.191 -0.133 0.513 -0.194 -0.296
realized niche
8. Type of 0.833 0.372 -0.052 0.203 0.053 0.069 -0.064 0.041 0.033 -0.082
production
ownership
10. Organizational 11.71 11.12 0.025 0.342 -0.156 0.053 -0.144 0.086 0.144 -0.124 0.110
size
11. Technological 60.61 90.99 0.116 0.263 -0.286 0.659 -0.561 0.528 0.667 -0.146 0.067 -0.069
development
12. Electric energy 30.22 40.38 0.259 0.359 -0.465 0.878 -0.862 0.663 0.911 -0.324 0.068 0.105 0.687
cost
13. Density 754.51 295.74 -0.231 -0.349 0.425 -0.578 0.829 -0.571 -0.760 0.730 -0.096 -0.161 -0.499 -0.758
14. Concentration 0.002 0.001 0.267 0.398 -0.534 0.733 -0.916 0.675 0.905 -0.577 0.078 0.158 0.611 0.903 -0.948
Correlations ≥ |0.01| are significant at p < 0.00001.
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linkage on the part of the members, supposes a guarantee of the supply of the
resources that these organizations need for their operations.
Model 1 shows an unexpected result: a negative and significant influence of the
economic recession (postwar period) on the probability of failure for the popula-
tion as a whole. However, if we analyse this influence through Models 6, 7, 8 and
9 (specific models by period and organizational form) we see that this result is spu-
rious. Shock periods (postwar period and European Union period) in any case, do
not influence the cooperatives’ probability of failure. However, these same periods
do influence the probability of failure of other organizational forms with a high
degree of significance. With these results, we accept Hypothesis 2.
Model 1 appears to indicate that the dictatorship period could benefit all orga-
nizational forms. However, when we analyse Models 4 and 5, we see a similar
result to Hypothesis 2. The dictatorship period does not have a significant influ-
ence on the cooperatives’ probability of failure but it does have a significant effect
on the probability of failure of other organizational forms: negative in this case.
Therefore, we can accept Hypothesis 3, since the fascist regime benefited other
organizational forms more than cooperatives, in spite of the fact that cooperatives
performed well to avoid this harmful influence.
In relation to the competition between organizational forms, the positive and
significant sign of the cooperative realized niche parameter during the total period
(Model 5), and for each period in particular (Models 8 and 9), points to support
for Hypothesis 4. However, the inverse of the hypothesis is not supported. Larger
realized niches of the ordinary capitalist form do not imply greater likelihood of
failure for firms integrated in the cooperative form. Therefore, the total absence
of significance in the parameters of the capitalist realized niche in Models 4, 6
and 7 support Hypothesis 5 with a high degree of significance. Cooperatives are
stronger competitors than other organizational forms.
Finally, we have also tested the influence of competition of cooperatives on
themselves. However, the results are not so clear. In spite of Model 4, which shows
a positive influence of the cooperative realized niche on the probability of failure
of cooperatives for the total period, an exhaustive analysis of this effect by period
shows that this effect is produced only during the dictatorship period (Model 6).
During the democracy period (Model 7), there is not a significant influence. There-
fore, Hypothesis 6 cannot be supported. These results suggest that cooperative iso-
lation is effective until the environment is so adverse that it forces them to compete
between themselves for new resources: members.
There are some significant influences of control variables on mortality rates in
the olive oil production industry. Technological development is a characteristic that
always assists survival. The most developed technology implies the least probabil-
ity of failure in any model.
Type of production ownership affects the probability of failure, but only in the
cooperative form (Models 4, 6 and 7). When the owner operates the cooperative,
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Table II. Piecewise exponential models of oil mill failure, 1944–98a
Period Total Dictatorship Democracy Total Total Dictatorship Democracy Dictatorship Democracy
Organizational form Total Total Total Cooperative Other Cooperative Cooperative Other Other
population population population
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Age periods
0–2 years 13.26 13.93 0.422 -11.43 13.61 -11.41 0.537 13.02 0.419
(558.52) (837.23) (1108.95) (2405.21) (660.38) (2425.51) (2014.85) (497.81) –
2–5 years -0.612 -0.626 -14.90 12.33 -0.731* 12.34 -14.62 -0.768* -15.56
(0.339) (0.339) – (1157.95) (0.356) (1167.34) – (0.361) –
5–10 years 0.283 0.275 11.82 0.008 0.322 -0.154 11.47 0.339 12.32
(0.160) (0.160) (443.57) (0.374) (0.176) (0.392) (805.93) (0.176) (513.42)
10–20 years 0.048 0.035 0.034 0.176 0.024 0.268 0.065 0.002 0.022
(0.034) (0.039) (0.087) (0.096) (0.036) (0.121) (0.189) (0.042) (0.099)
20–30 years -0.035 -0.043 0.005 -0.151 -0.028 -0.237 -0.024 -0.026 0.0004
(0.027) (0.031) (0.055) (0.080) (0.028) (0.124) (0.121) (0.033) (0.063)
30–40 years 0.030 0.018 0.074 0.068 0.031 -0.079 0.125 0.022 0.060
(0.026) (0.031) (0.046) (0.855) (0.027) (0.164) (0.103) (0.032) (0.052)
40–50 years -0.0003 -0.001 -0.028 0.075 -0.009 0.186 0.029 -0.009 -0.039
(0.020) (0.026) (0.033) (0.060) (0.023) (136) (0.070) (0.028) (0.039)
50+ years 0.001 0.009 -0.0009 -0.003 0.001 0.016 -0.010 0.008 0.002
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.005) (0.31) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009)
Cooperative form/other -0.755**** -0.818**** -0.722****
organizational forms (0.134) (0.197) (0.192)
Postwar period -0. 902*** 1.53**** -0.151 -0.576 1.34 1.76****
(0.263) (0.399) (0.896) (0.319) (1.18) (0.441)
European Union period 0.017 2.54**** 0.680 0.040 1.44 3.12***
(0.362) (0.729) (0.745) (0.476) (1.20) (0.945)
Dictatorship/democracy -1.55**** -1.55 -1.15**
(0.337) (1.08) (0.397)
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Cooperative realized niche 5.94**** 11.77**** 10.95** 5.39** 6.92**** 10.28** 5.71 12.43**** 13.58**
(6.41) (1.18) (4.01) (2.06) (0.812) (3.78) (6.31) (1.30) (5.20)
Capitalist realized niche -2.52** -0.881 -31.09** -5.05 -4.98** 3.24 -15.16 5.86** -40.82**
(0.859) (1.65) (11.19) (5.39) (1.91) (7.37) (17.66) (2.06) (14.75)
Fundamental niche - -0.0001 -0.001**** -0.0007* - -0.0001 -0.001 -0.0005 -0.001****
0.0009**** (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 0.0009**** (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004)
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Type of production -0.236* -0.176 -0.260 -1.46**** -0.127 -1.16** -1.35* -0.052 -0.133
ownership (0.103) (0.124) (0.186) (0.291) (0.110) (0.393) (0.472) (0.132) (0.200)
Organizational size -0.095**** -0.151**** -0.053**** -0.056*** -0.100**** -0.160**** -0.030 -0.144**** -0.057****
(0.010) (0.017) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.044) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016)
Technological development -0.154**** -0.224**** -0.122**** -0.149**** -0.155**** -0.259* -0.141**** -0.220**** -0.111****
(0.016) (0.035) (0.018) (0.030) (0.019) (0.126) (0.032) (0.036) (0.022)
Electric energy cost -0.248**** -0.676 -0.083 -0.034 -0.327**** -1.37 0.138 -0.354 -0.159
(0.044) (0.487) (0.129) (0.100) (0.053) (1.65) (0.246) (0.296) (0.154)
Density -0.001 0.005* 0.026 -0.0008 0.0002 0.006 0.017 0.004* 0.033
(0.001) (0.002) (0.014) (0.003) (0.001) (0.007) (0.027) (0.002) (0.017)
Concentration -670.17 1593.18 -2064.19 -1704.63 -573.61 2356.91 -1806.28 2132.81* -2093.68
(411.11) (1114.18) (1151.96) (931.59) (479.75) (3455.95) (1862.63) (1066.78) (1502.61)
Constant -25.44 -40.03 -13.43 -10.45 -26.12 -30.92 -14.99 -42.79 -14.10
(1117.36) (1674.47) – (3327.55) (1320.77) (3356.82) – (995.63) (2567.14)
Chi-squared (c2) 857.49**** 730.64**** 286.42**** 137.26**** 701.96**** 87.68**** 82.89**** 658.95**** 156.19****
Degrees of freedom 21 19 19 20 20 18 18 18 18
**** p < 0.0001; *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01: * p < 0.05.
a Standard errors are in parentheses.
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it has less probability of failure. Another result is that increase in organizational
size implies increase in the probability of survival. Only one model, among the
nine, is not significant in its coefficient, although its sign is also negative.
There is no significant influence of density and concentration on the probabil-
ity of failure of any organizational form. Electric energy cost also shows no sig-
nificant effect. Thus, it is not possible to draw conclusions on the sign of these
parameters.
CONCLUSIONS
Within the research line on cooperative form, there is a fundamental question
without a clear answer: ‘Does the cooperatives’ unusual ownership and governance
structure give them any advantage over their commercial rivals?’ (Barron et al.,
1998, p. 28). Depending on the authors and their focus, research results are dia-
metrically opposed. In this work, we answer it in the affirmative.
This paper has been an attempt to show that the cooperative ownership struc-
ture might be seen as a strategy to form stronger linkages with suppliers and, hence,
to obtain fundamental resources for survival. In a cooperative, the members are
its suppliers. That is to say, cooperatives link themselves to their suppliers by includ-
ing them in the ownership structure. Therefore, if this relationship were consid-
ered as an inter-organizational linkage (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Ingram and
Baum, 1997; Oliver, 1991; Stearns et al., 1987), or an organizational buffer accord-
ing to Miner et al. (1990), its effect would be to reduce the probability of failure.
In our opinion, the results in this paper support this idea. The advantages of the
Andalusian cooperatives go so far, but are cancelled by the typically hostile reac-
tion of the fascist ideology to cooperatives. This result is interesting because it
stresses the difference between the two definitions of legitimacy: cognitive and
socio-political legitimacy (Baum, 1996, p. 88). The latter is understood to be the
conformity of an organizational form to social and institutional expectations
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). A form acquires constitutive legitimacy when there
is little question in the minds of actors that it serves as the natural way to affect
some kind of collective action (Hannan and Carroll, 1992, p. 34). That is to say,
an organizational form gains legitimacy when it attains a socially taken-for-granted
character (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Our paper could be considered as a proof
of this difference. The fascist socio-political legality did not cause failure of the
cooperative form since the taken-for-granted legitimacy had a stronger influence.
Although Franco’s regime was legal because it promulgated laws, it is not so clear
that these laws were legitimate in this second sense.
The cooperative’s ownership structure is a buffer for other threats including
environmental shocks or economic depressions. Cooperatives are also stronger
competitors in relation to other organizational forms. They could be predators
because they reduce the realized niche of other organizational forms. However,
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other organizational forms cannot reduce the cooperatives’ realized niche 
(Brittain, 1994; Swaminathan and Wiedenmayer, 1991). Consequently, coopera-
tives increase the probability of failure of other organizational forms although the 
other forms cannot affect them. We also think cooperatives change the competi-
tion scale. They compete by resources, but through their members. That is to say,
they try to increase the number of members to obtain a larger quantity of
resources. Cooperatives compete through legitimacy since more legitimacy implies
a larger number of members and more resources for survival. However, this effect
is not clear. We have only obtained evidence of this phenomenon in the dictator-
ship period.
An advantage of the Spanish olive oil milling industry is that it allows us to sim-
plify the problem to one fundamental resource, the quantity of olives. This sim-
plification makes it easy to achieve two linked conclusions: firstly, if the main and
only resource is the olive, it is logical to think that an ownership structure that pro-
vides this resource will be more successful than other organizational forms.
However, this is not the same as saying: ‘all cooperatives are more successful’. We
could think about other kinds of cooperatives that do not have this characteristic
and, therefore, are not successful in this industry. For instance, we have not found
a one-only worker or customer cooperative in this industry during the analysed
period. We could conclude that this is a consequence of the work force and cus-
tomers not being strategic resources in this sector although they could be in other
industry sectors. The optimal cooperative form would be one that makes it easier
to obtain the main resource from the environment.
Further, as noted above, if there exists only one important resource, and its influ-
ence on the other organizational forms is controlled by its realized niche’s behav-
iour, it also seems logical to think that other variables are not significant. This could
be the explanation for the lack of significance of two of the most important vari-
ables in population ecology: density and concentration. We are inclined to think
that both density and concentration gather effects when there exist several and dif-
ferent important resources that cannot be individually controlled.
We have not proved that cooperatives are more efficient than other organiza-
tional forms in Williamson’s sense (1987), but if survival were synonymous with
efficacy, Andalusian cooperatives in the olive oil milling industry would be effica-
cious. If we add to this success factor their social characteristics of giving more
consideration to people (the human factor has priority over the capital one), or
their principles such as democracy, equality, equity, and solidarity, then, perhaps,
cooperatives would be seen with other eyes. Maybe they are not anachronisms
from other eras but a valid alternative to current economic instability or market
concentration.
More work is necessary with other sorts of cooperatives in other industries.
Although this population could be an exception, results from Barron et al. (1998)
allow us to suppose that our findings are not an isolated and only case.
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